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THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW
STATE ACTIVISM
Mark Side!*

A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR (NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE AND
SOCIETY). By Norman I. Silber. Boulder: Westview Press. 2001.
Pp. 184. $29.

The burgeoning field of nonprofit and philanthropic law has a new
and superb history in Norman Silber's pathbreaking A Corporate
Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector. In con
fronting "the history of efforts to control the creation and permissible
purposes for nonprofit corporations by states, and . . . the relocation of
these efforts to the Internal Revenue Service" (p. 5), Professor Silber
effectively delineates the rich history of our ambiguous, often con
flicted attempts to regulate the American nonprofit sector, and points
clearly to the ways in which history influences the current complexities
of state regulation. From a discredited era of state intrusion into the
purposes and goals of nonprofit formation, a history admirably ana
lyzed by Silber's volume, we have now turned to an inconsistent pat
tern of several decades of post-registration state monitoring of the
nonprofit sector - in some jurisdictions a virtual ceding of nonprofit
monitoring to the Internal Revenue Service, and in others a new state
activism well worth exploring.
The struggle to effectively balance oversight with freedom in the
regulation of the American nonprofit sector is a key theme of Silber's
work. This is, of course, a long-standing problem in American law. Be
cause of continuing concerns for the efficacy of IRS oversight, limita
tions on the right of citizens to have standing to sue upon misconduct
by nonprofits, and a virtual absence of effective means of self
regulation in the nonprofit sector, states - led by New York - have
at times aggressively exercised their powers to monitor, oversee and
regulate the nonprofit sector. At least one key state appears to be do
ing so now. Given the failure, or at least the limitations, of other over
sight means, it is perhaps inevitable that the states should step into this
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Research Scholar,
Obermann Center for Advanced Studies, University of Iowa. A.B. 1979, Princeton; J.D.
1985, Columbia. The author acknowledges support provided by the Obermann Center for
Advanced Studies, directed by Jay Semel, and useful comments from Sandy Boyd, Pat Cain,
Richard Koontz, and Ken Kress. - Ed.
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fray. That new state activism is well worth exploring in its own right but it is also not without significant problems, inconsistencies, and
limitations, as this Review indicates. The time has perhaps now ar
rived to put the new state activism into an analytical framework that
can help determine its utility in the regulation of the rapidly growing
and now considerably more complex American nonprofit sector.
I.

THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF AMERICAN NONPROFIT
REGULATION AND THE DISCRETIONARY TRADITION

Today the American nonprofit sector is, in Silber's words:
integral to the national economy and a valued part of [our] social fab
ric . . . . [It] embodies the philanthropic goodness, conviviality, cultural
excitement, and democratic spirit of the American people . . . . [and] has
provided a valued social location in which groups can operate without
pecuniary obsessions and with measures of success that are not necessar
ily related to financial profitability. (p. 2)

Yet organizations within the sector do not - perhaps should not coordinate activities and policies particularly effectively with each
other; that joyous chaos may be one of the chief attributes of
American civil society. The issues are legion: misconduct in the non
profit sector, such as the United Way debacle of the early 1990s;1 coor
dination and relief problems after September 11, including the prob
lems faced by the American Red Cross;2 a continuing convergence
between nonprofit and for-profit organizational forms and goals; weak
self-regulatory mechanisms in the sector; and many others. We have
little in the way of direct, resource-favored supervisory power to rely
upon even if we would wish to do so. The Internal Revenue Service
remains an uneven regulator of the sector, and many states devote very
few personnel or resources to nonprofit oversight.3
1. The United Way head used more than $600,000 in United Way funds for personal
expenses and travel. See Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of
More Than $600,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at Al; Felicity Barringer, United Way Head
is Forced Out in a Furor Over His Lavish Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at Al; see also
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1999).
Useful commentaries include Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector,
41 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1996); Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust
Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999); Harvey J. Goldschrnid,
The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Pro
posed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998).

2. Nick Cater, Attack Response Marred by Charities' Missteps, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 29, 2001, at 37 (reviewing missteps at the Red Cross); Deborah Son
tag, What Brought Bernardine Healy Down, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 23, 2001, at 32 (re
viewing Red Cross post-September 11 fundraising and controversies); Grant Williams, Tur
moil at the Red Cross, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. l, 2001, at 71 (reporting spreading
of questions raised surrounding September 11-related issues).
3. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400
(1998); Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of
Tax Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politi-
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And so, at least in many states, our legal regime for the nonprofit
sector works well in the good days and badly in the tougher times,
when some form of closer observation might be useful. But even in the
better days, the weak state of nonprofit regulation sparks exposes of
nonprofit deficiencies4 and reflexive calls to tighten regulation, often
beginning with moves to reimpose property taxation on nonprofits5 or
to over-regulate - in Silber's words, "threaten[ing] to eliminate all of
the important privileges for all organizations, not just the abusers"
(p. 4; italics omitted). The evolution of nonprofit regulation is the pri
mary topic of Professor Silber's book and may shed some light on the
future of nonprofit oversight.
Early in our history, state legislatures retained power over the
American charitable sector through the power to charter nonprofit
corporations. In the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures "gave
judges in some states and bureaucrats in others the primary authority
to stand guard at the main entrance to the sector and to monitor or
ganizational changes to existing groups" (p. 5). Much of Silber's book
is about the j udicial strand of this second period in nonprofit regula
tion, when state legislatures ceded substantial control of gate-keeping
and monitoring functions to judiciaries in some states and executive
branch officials in others. This long period, from about the 1850s until
the 1950s was marked in judge-dominant states, by a "vigorous ex
pan[ sion]" of judicial power, and, at least in New York, by "[holding]
onto a discretion which became so strong that their personal reserva
tions - religious, political, class, cultural, racial, and social - as a
matter of legal doctrine were sufficient to sanction disapproval" (p. 5).
Silber's volume is at its best in exposing the political, religious, racial,
social, and cultural biases that helped to guide judicial decisions on
nonprofit registration in New York in the late nineteenth century and
the first half of the twentieth century. Based loosely on the statutory
guide that judges approve only nonprofit applications with "lawful"
purposes, judicial discretion developed through rejection of blanket
cians, 51 U. PITI. L. REV. 577 (1990); George Rodrigue, For America's Nonprofit Sector, the
Watchdog Seldom Barks, NIEMAN REP., Mar. 22, 1998, at 50, 56.

4. Gilbert Gaul and Neil Borowski's series on this theme was nominated for the Pulitzer
Prize in 1994. See GILBERT GAUL & NEIL BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT
ECONOMY (1993).
5. For an earlier review of this debate, see Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Cor
porations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1992). For more recent discussions, see Rob Atkinson,
Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthe
ses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptu
alizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflec
tions on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 555 (1998); John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Chari
table Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657 (2001); and Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home
Front" for Charitable Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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approval of charters and the cultivation of a "jurisprudence of privi
lege which required applicants further to demonstrate that their con
duct would be socially beneficial, from the judge's perspective" (p. 32).
Silber traces a string of these cases, beginning with the rejection of
Augudath Hakehiloth, a social services and mutual aid association for
immigrants, whose application indicated that its meetings would occur
on Sundays. "A thing may be lawful, and yet not laudable," wrote the
trial court judge to whom the approval petition was brought under the
New York General Laws of 1895.6 Membership meetings on Sunday
violated "the public policy of the state, if not to [the] letter of its law."7
In the years that followed, New York's j udges expanded their inter
pretation of the language of the 1895 Membership Corporation Law,
which in Silber's words "explicitly required . . . judicial approval of
[nonprofit] certificates," and allowed judicial interpretation of the eli
gibility requirement of "any lawful purpose" contained in the statute
(p. 35). The judicial role would not be merely ministerial, but substan
tive as well:
The Legislature has prescribed simple means by which an artificial entity
may be created, and, when created, endowed with certain powers and
privileges. What more reasonable than that, before imparting legal life,
there should be judicial scrutiny of those qualifications which the law
makes essential, and not a mere perfunctory passing on what may be pre
sented.8

The implementation of this doctrine by New York judges took
several forms. A white Elks organization received judicial support in
its attempt to block the registration of a black Elks organization, os
tensibly as a consumer protection device to avoid confusion in organ
izational names.9 But, as Silber points out, "[c]loaking obtuseness as
impartiality allowed the court to use the incorporation law to perpetu
ate the social and cultural separation of the races" (p. 38). Other cases
extended the rationales for judicial intervention, especially following
the first World War and during the Red Scare of the 1910s and 1920s.
Allowing a Catalonian Nationalist Club to incorporate in New York in
1920 would not, in the words of the deciding judge, reflect "that the
great need of the time is the teaching of American 'culture' " rather
than the slowing of "homogeneity."10 The amended certificate of the
Lithuanian Worker's Literature Society, which was made up of
6. P. 32 (quoting In re Agudath Hekahiloth, 42 N.Y.S. 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1896)).
7. Id.
8. P. 36 (quoting Justice Goff in In re Wendover Athletic Ass'n, 128 N.Y.S. 561, 562
(Sup. Ct. 1911)).
9. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent & Protective Order
of Elks of the World, 98 N.E. 756, 757 (N.Y. 1912).
10. Pp. 39-40 (quoting In re Catalonian Nationalist Club, 184 N.Y.S. 132 (Sup. Ct.
1920)).
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Socialist Party members and sought to publish socialist materials, was
disapproved because it would publish "propaganda, which our Penal
Law makes criminal and even felonious."11 Judicial and executive in
tervention sought to govern the extension of nonprofit corporations in
certain business activities by asserting their "own role in determining
the boundaries for nonprofit corporate activities and widen[ing] those
boundaries to allow new opportunities for business activities, provided
they were technically compliant with established rules."12
Silber provides other useful examples of the perils of the discre
tionary period as well, making a strong argument that judges and their
biases predominated in nonprofit chartering decisions in New York
and other states between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centu
ries (pp. 48-81). As Silber shows at least briefly, the stereotypes and
political views that New York judges reflected were also found in
other state courts (p. 5). But then Silber attempts to broaden the ap
plicability of these state court opinions: "For a considerable part of
American history, therefore, the thought of officials about what was a
proper role for nonprofits can be illuminated by analyzing the actions
of common law judges in New York, Pennsylvania, and the other
states in which reported opinions can be found" (p. 5). What of the
other states, in which "legislatures gave . . . bureaucrats . . . the pri
mary authority to stand guard at the main entrance to the sector and
to monitor organizational changes to existing groups?" (p. 5). Did the
bureaucrats in these states seek to expand their authority in the way
judges did in the states of judicial rule? Were they given - or did they
obtain - the stark levels of discretion that judges came to use in those
states? And did any excesses of their exercise of authority contribute
to the collapse of the system of authorizing judges and state officials,
the resulting weakness of state authority (which persists today), and
the "relocation of these efforts to the Internal Revenue Service"
(p. 5)?
If executive branch officials in other states expressed the same
stereotypes and political views as did New York and Pennsylvania
judges, the record provided in Silber's volume fails to prove the
breadth of that notion. Did state-level executive branch officials judge
nonprofit applications based on "personal reservations - religious,
political, class, culture, racial, and social . . . . " (p. 5)? And if they did,
were they able, as a legal matter, to "[hold] onto a discretion . . . so
strong" that their biases "were sufficient to sanction disapproval"
(p. 5)? This direction for research is clearly drawn by Silber's volume,
1 1 . Pp. 40-41 (quoting In re Lithuanian Workers' Literature Soc'y, 196 AD. 262, 267
(N.Y. App. Div. 1921)).
12. P. 47 (discussing the then-famous case of the Decimo Club and the business activi
ties of its founder, Hugh B. Monjar). See Southerland v. Decimo Club, Inc., 142 A. 786 (Del.
Ch. 1928). Silber discusses Decirno Club at length. Pp. 42-47.
·
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and is a fertile ground for follow-up work. Silber himself, however,
fails to provide a clear answer to these questions.13
This long period of official state judicial and executive dominance
in the nonprofit chartering and monitoring process ended in the 1950s
under scrutiny from young members of the legal community. "Assail
ing the common law tradition, these revisionists utterly routed the dis
cretionary tradition. Within less than a decade . . . judicial discre
tion . . . had been recast and converted into an improper judicial
usurpation that spurned newly cherished legal values" (p. 6). A series
of law review notes and other articles, inspired by legal realism, led
the way, along with cases in the civil rights arena.14 By the early 1960s,
the discretionary tradition had been severely limited, rendering ap
proval of new nonprofits a virtual entitlement.15
Since the decline of the discretionary tradition, registration of
nonprofits has become largely ministerial at the state level. This has
placed greater emphasis on monitoring and enforcement of nonprofits,
a task usually sited by state statute in offices of attorneys general and
secretaries of state. Active monitoring and enforcement of nonprofits
is rare in some states, episodic in others, and reasonably well-engaged
in a few. Inconsistency remains the hallmark of state action, both
across and within states.
That this history has led to a certain awkwardness in the state
regulation of nonprofits has long been clear. Writing in the early
1960s, Kenneth Karst noted the relative weakness and inconsistency of
state regulation, a legacy of a perhaps over-aggressive earlier charter
ing enforcement and state and nonprofit ambivalence toward non
profit regulation. Karst proposed an alternative - state charities
commissions based loosely on an English model16 - as a response to
13. Silber cites three states - Iowa, Massachusetts, and Mississippi - in which legisla
tive or executive branch officials retained control over nonprofit incorporation. At least one
Iowa case continues to stand for the fairly expansive proposition that the state non-profit
formation statute (then Iowa Code § 504.1) conferred substantial interpretive and decision
authority on executive branch officials rather than merely "ministerial" tasks. See Iowa v.
All-Iowa Agric. Ass'n, 48 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1951); Iowa v. Civic Action Comm., 28 N.W.2d
467 (Iowa 1947) (upholding grant of non-profit charter to political organization).
14. Chapter 4 of Silber's volume, The Corrosion of the Discretionary Conception, pp. 83126, discusses the downfall of the discretionary tradition in useful detail.
15. But, of course, the judges did not give way quite so easily, as Silber also explains.
Even into the 1970s, the judiciary was still trying to regulate the chartering process in par
ticular cases. See pp. 130-31.
16. For more detailed information on the supervisory role of the English Charity Com
mission, see ELIZABETH CAIRNS, CHARITIES: LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1997), and
James Randolph Michels, U.K. Charity Law: ls it Creating a True Democracy of Giving? 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 169 (2001). Martin Knapp and Jeremy Kendall provide some indi
cation of the failure of the Commission to live up to its expectations, especially since the
Nathan Report of 1952. Martin Knapp & Jeremy Kendall, Policy Issues for the UK Volun
tary Sector in the 1990s, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY 221 (Avner
Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui eds., 1993). Evelyn Brody critiques the American reliance on the
charity commission model. Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector,
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the insufficiencies of state judicial and executive administration.17 And
others in the intervening years have proposed alternate ways to effec
tively monitor nonprofits and enforce state statutes governing them
without returning to the prejudice and inconsistency of the discretion
ary era.18
II.

BEYOND THE DISCRETIONARY TRADITION: TOWARD A NEW

STATE ACTIVISM IN NONPROFIT MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT

Developments since Karst's well-known article have perhaps re
duced some of the perceived advantages of English-style charity com
missions as a rough model for American charity regulation.19 Similarly,
other proposed models of monitoring and enforcement failed to take
hold, while structures of self-regulation and accountability within the
nonprofit and philanthropic sectors remain weak. The awkward, in
consistent nature of state regulation of the nonprofit sector remains as
intractable a problem as when Karst and others identified it some
thirty years ago. In removing judicial bias and moving toward the twin
systems of federal tax regulation and state corporate and trust regula
tion, nonprofits are often not effectively monitored or regulated by ei
ther system, leading to contradictory patterns of under-regulation,
over-regulation, and appropriate action, to a lack of ongoing moni
toring, and occasionally to bursts of activity when specific issues arise.
The migration of discretion, in Silber's useful phrase, has continued
from the 1950s to this day.20
Several examples indicate the complex, perhaps contradictory na
ture of state regulation today. All come from New York, the core of
Silber's exploration of the stages of nonprofit regulation and to this
day a key laboratory for state-level monitoring of nonprofits. It is no
41 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1996). For discussion of the utility of the English approach in the Ca
nadian context, see Deborah J. Lewis, A Principled Approach to the Law of Charities in the
Face ofAnalogies, Activities and the Advancement of Education, 25 QUEEN'S L.J. 679 (2000).
17. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Re
sponsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960).
18. For review and useful discussion of competing proposals, see, for example, Brody,
supra note 16.

19. See Brody, supra note 16; Knapp & Kendall, supra note 16.
20. P. 136. In New York, discretion migrated from judges to administrative authorities
responsible for approvals. Pp. 136-38. An example of the sometimes wildly erratic nature of
state oversight of nonprofits occurs in the regulation of fundraising, as my colleague Richard
Koontz points out, where state action ranges from the largely nonexistent to the occasionally
intrusive. For earlier discussion, see, for example, Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality
of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605
(1991); Ellen Harris et al., Fundraising Into the 1990s: State Regulation of Charitable Solicita
tion After Riley, in 1 TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY 1 (1989). For a recent problem in this area,
see Melissa G. Liazos, Can States Impose Registration Requirements on Online Charitable
Solicitors? 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1379 (2000) .
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accident that New York is the primary laboratory for Silber's volume
and remains a key subject for study of state monitoring of nonprofits
today. At the executive level, the New York State Attorney General,
empowered and obligated by law to oversee nonprofits,21 has re
mained active in the nonprofit arena, both in formal monitoring and
enforcement and in its less formal varieties. If New York was a pio
neer in judicial discretion over the nonprofit registration process, it is
perhaps not surprising that it has also been a pioneer in state re
sponses to the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the post
discretionary era. The New York Attorney General has, in recent dec
ades and particularly in recent years, sought to exercise closer and
more public oversight of the nonprofit sector in the absence of other
realistic alternatives in the . post-discretionary era and in the midst of
rapid growth of the sector.22
That oversight includes regular monitoring, informal but strong
pressure on certain nonprofits to reform or alter inappropriate prac
tices, with the threat of judicial action looming in the background;
formal action to intervene in certain cases; and attempts to expand the
recognized scope of the Attorney General's jurisdiction into new ar
eas. In some cases it has been effective, in some cases highly problem
atic.

21. In New York, the role of the Attorney General is stipulated in the New York Not
For-Profit Corporation Law and the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, among
other statutes. For the New York Attorney General's position on these powers, as well as an
extensive review of Attorney General power under specific sections of each statute, see
Nathan M. Courtney & James G. Siegal, The Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's
Charities Bureau, at www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.html [hereinafter The Regulatory
Role].

22. The New York State Attorney General has statutory authority to oversee and regu
late the nonprofit sector under the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, including
authority over a wide range of nonprofit corporate changes. See The Regulatory Role, supra
note 21, at 1 . The Attorney General's office also claims that " [t]he Attorney General's su
pervisory authority over charities is rooted in the common law of charitable trusts and cor
porations, as well as the parens patriae power of the state to protect the interest of the public
in assets pledged to public purposes." Id.
The Attorney General's authority to oversee the administration of charitable assets in
New York State, "representing the interests of beneficiaries of charitable dispositions and
enforcing laws governing the conduct of fiduciaries of·charitable estates," is also derived
from the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Id. According to the Attorney General,
its roles in the oversight of conduct of fiduciaries of charitable assets include "broad statu
tory authority to prosecute and defend legal actions to protect the interests of the State and
the public" under the New York State Executive Law, authority under the Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law to "investigate transactions and relationships of trustees for the purpose of
determining whether or not property held for charitable purposes has been and is being
properly administered" (EPTL § 8-1.4(i)), the power to issue subpoenas and the EPTL and
the Executive Law, and the power to "institute appropriate proceedings to secure compli
ance with this section and to secure the proper administration of any trust, corporation, or
other relationship to which this section applies" (EPTL § 8-1.4(m)). Id. at 2.

1320

Michigan Law Review

III. THE AMBIGUOUS RESURGENCE OF OVERSIGHT:

[Vol. 100:1312
WALLACE

READER'S DIGEST AND THE INFORMAL USES OF STATE POWER

The New York dispute over the disposition of controlled gifts from
the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds is a modern illustration of the im
portant but occasionally less formal role of state regulatory authorities
in the nonprofit arena. The Wallace-Reader's Digest dispute arose out
of the special context of earlier gifts by the Wallace family to thirteen
elite cultural, environmental, and academic institutions close to the
philanthropic interest of the founders of Reader's Digest, DeWitt and
Lila Wallace, and their advisors.23 In the 1980s, before DeWitt and
Lila Wallace died, they made substantial bequests to those thirteen
organizations in a complex and unusual form.24
The bequests stipulated that the donated funds would be managed
by seven "supporting organizations" rather than by the beneficiaries
themselves. The "supporting organizations" were largely controlled by
the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and Reader's Digest and . the as
sets of the seven supporting organizations were substantially invested
in Reader's Digest stock. This caused a rift between Wallace-Reader's
Digest and the institutional beneficiaries. As the New York Times ex
plained,
[t]he endowment funds, heavily invested in Reader's Digest stock, were
administered for the recipients by seven organizations under restrictions
that impeded the selling of Digest stock. The [value of the Reader's Di
gest] shares plummeted in the 1990's as the stock market took off, but
the arrangement buttressed the Reader's Digest at a turbulent time. The
recipient groups, however, could only watch as they missed better in
vestment opportunities.25

23. Specifically, the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds beneficiaries were the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the Open Space Institute, Scenic
Hudson, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, the Metropolitan Opera, the
New York City Ballet, the Vivian Beaumont Theater, the New York City Opera, the
Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York, the Chamber Music Society of New York,
Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and the Wildlife Conservation Society in New
York.
24. The Wallace-Reader's Digest dispute is discussed in Ralph Blumenthal, 13 Institu
tions Obtain Control of Vast Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, at Al. For an account of a
senior attorney in the Attorney General's office discussing the Wallace-Reader's Digest dis
pute, see William Josephson, Guiding Practioners and Fiduciaries on Charities, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at 1. See also Janet L. Fix, Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and N. Y. Attorney
General Reach Settlement, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2001, at 13. For an earlier
treatment focusing on the shareholder dissatisfaction with the declining price of Reader's
Digest stock, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Faith Ebbs on Reader's Digest Stock, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. '16, 1998, at Dl, and Geraldine Fabrikant, Reader's Digest Gives the Arts a Lesson in
Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al. Dueling statements by the Wallace-Reader's Di
gest Funds and by the New York Attorney General are cited infra notes 30-31 .
25. See Blumenthal, supra note 24.
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According to statistics compiled by the New York Times, a number
of the beneficiaries lost money on the portion of the Wallace bequest
that was controlled by the intermediate "supporting organizations."
But the cultural institutions profited on the portion of the Wallace be
quest that they themselves controlled and diversified. At the end of
fiscal year 1 997, for example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art's total
share of the Wallace bequest was $370.2 million. Of that, $196.3 mil
lion was controlled by a Digest supporting organization and held in
Digest stock, and that portion of the portfolio had declined in value by
17% since the end of 1991. The other $173.9 million of the bequest 
including dividends on the Digest stock - was controlled directly by
the Museum and invested in a more diversified manner; in that six
year period it appreciated 47.8% . Lincoln Center's26 experience was
similar: in the same time period it lost 17% on the portion of the port
folio controlled by a Digest supporting organization and held in Digest
stock, and gained 23.9% on the portion of the gift that it controlled.27
The New York State Attorney General's office joined this complex
and confusing fray in 1998, when it learned that some of the ultimate
institutional beneficiaries (most of whom were based in New York
State) were concerned that the Digest-influenced supporting organiza
tions had declined to diversify holdings away from weak Digest stock
despite some institutions' desire to diversify. The Attorney General's
office was concerned primarily about potential conflicts of interest in
the decisionmaking involving supporting organizations that were
heavily influenced by the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and the
management of Reader's Digest, because under New York law chari
table fiduciaries are required to administer charitable funds for the
benefit of recipients rather than for other purposes. One corporate
watchdog and Digest investor put the problem in fairly blunt terms:
[M]y concerns were [that] there were tremendous conflicts of interest in
herent in the foundation [Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds] and the com
pany [Reader's Digest]. The company was making decisions for the
benefit of the foundation and the foundation was making decisions for

26. The Lincoln Center organizations included in the Wallace-Readers Digest settle
ment included the Metropolitan Opera (receiving approximately $92 million); New York
City Ballet ($65 million); Vivian Beaumont Theater ($59 million); New York City Opera
($59 million); Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York ($26 million); and the Chamber
Music Society of New York ($13 million). Ralph Blumenthal, Institutions Finally Gain Con
trol of Large Reader's Digest Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, at Al.
27. Of the seven organizations profiled by the New York Times, only one appeared to
have lost money both on the portfolio controlled by a Digest supporting organization and
held in Digest stock, and on the portfolio (including Digest stock dividends) that it con
trolled itself. That was Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, which lost 51.2% in the
1991-1997 timeframe on the Digest-controlled portfolio and lost 16.1 % on the portfolio it
controlled. Id.

1322

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1312

the benefit of the company and no one was making decisions for the
benefit of the outside shareholders.28

The Attorney General appears to have strongly but informally
urged the parties to come to a settlement and reportedly threatened
subpoenas and a lawsuit.29 That pressure seems to have had the same
effect. The Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds announced in May 2001
that $1.7 billion would be transferred from control of the supporting
organizations to control by the thirteen ultimate institutional benefici
aries, the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the others.30 The shift was
announced not as a written agreement between the New York State
Attorney General and the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds, but in
separate press releases from each party, and press reports in which the
two sides issued overlapping but not equivalent - and not particularly
friendly - comments.31 The New York Attorney General's statement
emphasized the shift as an "agreement" between the Funds and the
Attorney General's office that "resolv[ed] concerns expressed by [At
torney General] Spitzer's office. "32 The Attorney General announced
"an historic agreement" in which
upon the recommendation of the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds, the
[seven Wallace] Supporting Organizations [established to benefit the
thirteen institutional recipients] will be dissolved and all of their assets,
which include both Reader's Digest stock and other, diversified holdings,
will be transferred to the 13 charities so that they will now be able to di
rectly manage their own assets in a manner consistent with the wishes of

28. Blumenthal, supra note 26.
29. See id.; Ann Marie Chaker, Reader's Digest Funds Revamp, Give Control of Assets
to Charities, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2001, at B4; Katia Hetter, Reader's Digest Deal Benefits
Groups, NEWSDA Y, May 4, 2001, at A59.
30. The Reader's Digest statement, Wallace Funds Transfer $1.7 Billion to 13 Charitable
Institutions, can be found at http://www.wallacefunds.org/newsroom. The Metropolitan Mu

seum of Art received $424 million, Macalester College $303 million, the Wildlife Conserva
tion Society $191 million, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation $155 million, the Open Space
Institute $115 million, Scenic Hudson Inc. $115 million, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer
Center $100 million, Metropolitan Opera Association $92 million, New York City Ballet $65
million, Vivian Beaumont Theater $59 million, New York City Opera $59 million, Philhar
monic Symphony Society of New York $26 million, and the Chamber Music Society of New
York $13 million. The agreements stipulated that each recipient would "place these assets in
a newly-created endowment fund named for the Wallaces. Income from the endowments
will be devoted to projects consistent with the wishes of the founding donors and the histori
cal practices of the supporting organizations." Id.
31. For the Attorney General's statement, see Spitzer Announces Resolution Involving
$3.2 Billion Legacy Left by Founders of Reader's Digest; 13 Major Charities Including the
Met, Sloan-Kettering, Colonial Williamsburg, Will Now Control Own Funds; Reorganiza
tion Also Includes New, Independent Board for Wallace-Reader's Digest Foundation
[hereinafter New York Attorney General May 4 statement], at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2001/may/may04a_Ol.html.
32. New York Attorney General May 4 statement, supra note 31.
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the Wallaces and the historical practices of the Wallace Supporting Or
ganizations.33

The Attorney General's concerns had gone beyond control over a
charitable beneficiary's invested funds to a concern for Reader's
Digest's control over the investments and practices of the Wallace
Reader's Digest Funds. The Attorney General thus also announced
that "the Wallace Funds, which hold a 50% share of Reader's Digest
voting stock, have taken steps to modernize their governing structure,
resolving concerns expressed by Spitzer's office. The new corporate
structure, implemented by the foundations two months ago, is de
signed to ensure fully independent decision making, particularly when
it comes to investment decisions."34 Attorney General Spitzer empha
sized that "these steps will help ensure the long-term health and vi
ability of the Wallaces' bequest and benefit the arts, cultural, medical,
environmental and historic preservation communities for generations
to come," closing with a swipe at the practices of the Wallace Funds
and the supporting organizations: "This divestiture by the Supporting
Organizations moves the Wallaces' bequest into the 21st century with
a sound investment strategy."35
Wallace-Reader's Digest may have resisted pressure to transfer
control over the bequests to the recipient groups and may have re
sisted criticism of the interlocking structure of the company, Funds,
and supporting organizations. Likewise it appears that the pressure
applied by two New York Attorneys General - first Dennis Vacco,
then Eliot Spitzer - played a substantial role in urging Wallace
Reader's Digest to bend on both counts. The Attorney General's in
quiry and pressure was apparently central to accelerating the negotia
tions that took place, and to the settlement that resulted. And, in this
case, an informal process seems to have produced the right result in
philanthropic terms. But it is also clear that these informal, pressuring
processes were the only means to resolve an increasingly knotty
problem of conflicted interests and philanthropic capital short of for33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Comments by the recipient groups - some of which had complained earlier of
investment and Reader's Digest stock sale restrictions - were considerably more muted, as
the recipients tried to antagonize neither the Wallace Funds nor the Attorney General. The
President of the Metropolitan Museum allowed the Attorney General's office to issue a
bland statement that " [a)lthough this agreement provides no new funding to the Metropoli
tan, it does give it the ability to directly oversee this investment. In this way, the institution
will continue to carry Lila Acheson Wallace's legacy into the future." Id. The executive di
rector of Scenic Hudson was quoted by the Attorney General's office as saying:
This is great news for Scenic Hudson. It puts us on a firm foundation for the new century
and helps ensure the stability of our land-preservation work. The fact that we have been en
trusted to manage these resources should give us increased credibility with our funders,
whose help we need more than ever.
Id.
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mal litigation. The informal processes went forward in an environment
in which the philanthropic community itself did not have structures of
self-regulation and accountability in place to resolve such issues before
a regulatory authority became involved in its informal capacities,
threatening more formal action.
IV.

THE AMBIGUOUS EXTENSION OF OVERSIGHT: NEW YORK

COMMUNITY TRUST AND THE FAILED EXPANSION OF STATE POWER

By the 1990s a new form of philanthropy was expanding rapidly
throughout the United States. Community foundations - pools of
funds donated by, in most cases, local philanthropists, had begun to
remake the American philanthropic landscape and to remake tradi
tional relationships between individual donors and charitable causes.
By 2000 there were over 500 community foundations and funds in the
United States with assets of over $27 billion � more than double the
$12 billion in assets reported as recently as 1995. Philanthropic dona
tions by American community foundations have quadrupled since
1990.36
Community foundations have built their growth on the logical as
sumption that pooling philanthropic funds and using those pooled
funds in a focused way on local problems may have a faster and
deeper impact on local social issues. This concept has enabled com
munity foundations to attract funds through direct donations, without
restriction on the application of those funds to local charitable, educa
tional, and other causes. While that form of giving is warmly wel
comed by community foundations because it allows the foundations
maximum flexibility in grantmaking, many philanthropists restrict the
use of their funds to specific organizations, causes, or fields, desiring
the administrative convenience, investment management, and philan
thropic focus of donating through community foundations but wanting
a continuing role in determining where and how their philanthropic
dollars will be distributed. Donors that restrict the use of their funds
know that a significant feature of community foundations - the key
innovation when community foundations were introduced by attorney
Frederick Goff in 1913 in Cleveland - will protect the utility of their
philanthropy as social needs change. That is the "variance power,"
under which donors and community foundations agree that the foun
dation may redirect a donor's chosen philanthropy if the original re
striction or request is made redundant or impossible due to the pas
sage of time.37 In 1971, the New York Community Trust exercised that
36. The Foundation Center, Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates 2001, at
http://www.fdncenter.org/research.
37. The variance power of community foundations has often been analogized to cy pres,
the power of a court to order a change in purpose in a charitable trust or other instrument.
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variance power with respect to six trusts created decades earlier, di
recting grants away from a major New York social service organiza
tion, the Community Service Society, and toward more flexible grant
making. The Community Service Society's challenge of that action in
the 1990s marked the first significant judicial challenge to the use of
the variance power by community foundations, and brought the New
York Attorney General into the fray.38
In the 1940s, Laura Spelman Rockefeller and other committed
New York philanthropists made bequests to the New York Commu
nity Trust for the benefit of the Community Service Society, a private,
charitable New York agency that has served the city's poor since the
mid-nineteenth century. When Rockefeller and the others made their
bequests, they and the New York Community Trust signed a trust
resolution which provided that the Community Trust would deliver
the income from the invested bequests to the Community Service
Society, but that the Community Trust might also vary the disposition
of her bequest from her specific intention. In the words of the trust
resolution,
any such expressed desire of the donor shall be respected and observed,
subject, however, in every case to the condition that if and whenever it
shall appear to the Distribution Committee [of the Community Trust] . . .
that circumstances have so changed since the execution of the instrument
containing any gift, grant, devise or bequest as to render unnecessary,
undesirable, impractical or impossible a literal compliance with the terms
of such instrument, such Committee may at any time or from time to
time direct the application of such gift, grant, devise or bequest to such
other public educational, charitable or benevolent purpose as, in their
judgment, will most effectually accomplish the general purpose . . . with
out regard to and free from any specific restriction limitation or direction
contained in such instrument.39

Variance power can be understood as a contractual form of cy pres that obviates the need
for judicial involvement in acquiescing to and determining a changed or new charitable pur
pose, and that eliminates the long-standing doctrinal complexities and inflexibilities of cy
pres. On cy pres, see Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1 1 1 1
(1993); Edith Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L . REV. 375
(1953); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding
the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 HAW. L. REV. 353 (1999); Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross
D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational
Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 545 (1989); Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and
the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635 (1988).
38. Cmty. Serv. Soc'y v. N.Y. Cmty. Trust (In re Preiskel), 275 A.D.2d 171 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000), motion for leave to appeal denied, 751 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 2001). This case is de
scribed in some detail below given its significance for the regulation of community philan
thropy in the United States, and for the future role of state attorneys-general and other state
executive authorities in monitoring and reviewing the "variance power" decisions of com
munity foundations and trusts.
39. Id. at 174.
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For several decades, until the early 1970s, this process worked
smoothly. Monies from the Laura Spelman Memorial and the other
designated trusts were invested by the New York Community Trust,
and on a regular basis income from the invested assets of the desig
nated funds were directed to the Community Service Society in sup
port of its social programs. The situation changed drastically in 1970,
when the Community Trust initiated a review of its funding proce
dures and priorities. The Community Service Society claims that the
Community Trust initiated this review, in the words of the appellate
court, "to eliminate as much as possible the designated funds and ex
pand Community Trust's discretion with regard to the distribution of
funds. The Community Trust rejected that explanation of its moti
vations, claiming that "the impetus for the review was the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, which made clear that charitable foundations where the
donors exercised inordinate control over the distribution of monies
ran the risk of losing tax-exempt status."41
The Community Trust's review of its grants to the Community
Service Society also coincided with a program and organizational re
view by the Community Service Society of its own activities. Deeply
affected by the social movements of the late 1960s, the Community
Service Society
"40

change[d] how services were provided. Instead of requiring individuals in
need of assistance to make an appointment to come to one of its four of
fices, it was decided to move operations into community groups . . . such
as transient hotels, hospital and housing projects . . . . [A]ssistance would
no longer always be directly provided by [the Community Service Soci
ety,] but could be channeled through existing community-based organi
zations.42

In the words of the New York appellate court, "CSS was to be trans
formed from a social services agency to one sharing power with com
munity-based organizations. "43
As a result of the Community Trust's internal review of its own
grantmaking policies, a New York Times article on the changes un
derway at Community Service Society, and the Society's own internal
review,44 in March 1971 the Community Trust suspended further pay40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 175.
43. Id. In the early 1 970s, traditional New York philanthropy was not yet accustomed to
working with community-based organizations, especially those working to support
empowerment as well as direct services, although it is not altogether clear to what extent this
factor played a role in Community Trust's decision to suspend automatic grant payments to
the Society. Id. at 175-76.
44. The appellate court appears to have believed that the Community Trust's suspen
sion of grants to CSS was based on an article in the New York Times, describing the pro
posed changes at CSS as a "Copernican revolution." When the key Community Trust em-
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ments to CSS and in September 1971 formally exercised its variance
power to revoke the designated grants program of the six original
trusts at a meeting of its Distribution Committee, and altered them to
become " 'semi-designated fund[s] for the improvement of health and
welfare in New York City.' "45 Automatic grantmaking to Community
Service Society ended, though some discretionary grants were still
made until at least 1995.46
In 1995, Community Service Society filed suit, seeking to compel
an accounting of funds invested and distributed from the six trusts be
tween 1928 and 1995, and directing distribution of income from the
designated funds. The case came before the New York Surrogate, Eve
Preminger, who ruled that the Community Trust had abused its vari
ance power. The Surrogate directed an accounting for the period from
1989 to 1999 calculating New York's six year statute of limitations for
trust accounts from 1995, when the suit was filed. The Surrogate con
cluded with one of the few tests that courts have ever delineated to
guide the exercise of a foundation's variance power over designated
trust funds. A finding of "undesirability" within the meaning of the
Community Trust's trust resolution sufficient to allow the Trust to
vary the terms of the bequestor " 'must be grounded in a change of
circumstance that negatively affects the designated charity to such a
degree that it would be likely to prompt a donor of the fund to re
direct it.' "47 Exercise of the variance power will be upheld only where
"identifiable negative details" provide evidence of "undesirability" in
carrying out the original trust instructions. The actions of a trust in
utilizing the variance power will be judged against an "abuse of discre
tion" standard, arid if a trust utilizes that criterion and standard, "the
courts must afford its decision maximum deference in review."48
Since Community Trust's notice of its changing policies to the
Society "fell short of conveying to CSS notice of a complete termina
tion of its interests . . . . muddl[ing] the message of an otherwise clear

ployee reviewed the CSS study and prepared a report in April 1971, several weeks after the
Trust's Distribution Committee had decided to suspend grants to CSS, she wrote that
" '[f]rom this document [the CSS study] it appears unlikely that we could continue to make
grants to CSS based on its direct service to individuals. But, if these funds were discretionary
rather than designated, we would most likely make grants to CSS based on its excellent pro
gram and projects.' " Id. at 176. (emphasis omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 177-78. The Community Trust claimed that the decision to exercise its variance
power in September 1971 had been clearly communicated at the time to the Society's Execu
tive Director and Board Chair; CSS denied that such communication had taken place, indi
cating that it believed, until it was alerted to the contrary by Chemical Bank in 1993, that the
grants it had received in the intervening twenty-two years had come from the automatic pro
visions of the six original trusts.
47. Id. at 179.
48. Id. at 179-80.
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repudiation . . . there was no effective repudiation"49 and the six year
statute of limitations for trust accountings in New York - which
would have barred the Society's 1995 suit - did not begin to run when
the change in funding took place in 1971. Instead, the statute of limita
tions began to run in 1995, when the action was commenced, and thus
the six years prior to the commencement of the proceedings were in
cludable in the accounting ordered.50 The parties cross-appealed and
the New York Attorney General joined the case, arguing that a com
munity foundation should be required to provide notice to a state ex
ecutive authority, in this case the Attorney General, when a charitable
trust exercises its variance power.51
The Appellate Court agreed with the Surrogate that the New York
Community Trust had abused its variance power to alter the six trusts
from designated funds in favor of the Community Service Society to
more flexible grantmaking. The Court reiterated that the trusts clearly
"intended that CSS receive specific distributions," and rejected the
Community Trust's claim that a change in circumstances and the pol
icy directions at the Community Service Society made the trust desig
nation "undesirable" under the terms of the wills.
Community Trust, arguably unhappy with mandated allocations, claims
that the change in CSS's approach from being a direct provider to one af
filiated with community organizations was an "undesirable" change in
circumstances. That distinction . . . appears . . . virtually meaningless,
since there is no claim that CSS has retreated from its overriding purpose
of servicing the need. As a result, the Surrogate reasonably found that
Community Trust abused its discretion, since there is no showing that
CSS has deviated from its primary purpose.52
49. Id. at 179.
50. Id.
5 1 . The Attorney General also argued against the application of the six year statute of
limitations period for trust accountings. Brief of Cross-Appellant New York State Attorney
General at 44, In re Laura Spelman Rockefeller Mem'l, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2756
(M-269} [hereinafter Attorney General Brief] (on file with author).
52. N.Y. Crnty. Trust, 275 A.D.2d at 182. The Appellate Court upheld the Surrogate's
decision that community foundations must make a "finding" before utilizing the variance
power, and that the actions of a trust in exercising the power must be judged against an
"abuse of discretion" standard, and affirmed the Surrogate's use of each standard. The
Court also upheld the Surrogate's substantive standard for judging the exercise of variance
powers in "undesirability" cases, restating the restrictiveness of the test, arguably in even
stronger and broader terms favoring the designated charities, for future cases.
The Surrogate's conclusion, that exercise of the variance power should be limited to those
situations where "identifiable negative details" may be offered to substantiate the "undesir
ability" of continued payments, appears to be an equitable and definable standard. Thus, in
a given case, if it were shown that the designated charity, for whatever reason, was no longer
carrying out its stated purpose, then a finding of undesirability might be made. Here, how
ever, while designated funding of community-based approaches might be undesirable from
the Trust's viewpoint, it cannot be said that such an approach compromises the intention of
the trust creators, which is the determinative factor.
Id. at 182-83.
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Thus on the question of appropriate use of the variance power, the
appellate court found, with the Surrogate, that the Community Trust
had misused the variance power in transforming the six trusts from
designated funds to flexible grantmaking sources. But the appellate
court also disagreed with the Surrogate's finding that the Community
Trust's repudiation was not absolute, thus that the six year New York
statute of limitations had not begun to run in 1971. Citing the record
of contacts between the Community Trust and the Society, the under
standings of the Society's then General Director, and a history of over
twenty years of grant applications after 1971, the appellate court found
that clear repudiation had been conveyed from the Community Trust
to the Society. Having ruled that repudiation was effective in 1971, the
New York State six year statute of limitations began to run at that
time, time-barring the action initiated in 1995.53
The Attorney General's intervention in the dispute, as counsel for
the "ultimate charitable beneficiaries" of the action, was perhaps the
least noticed element in a case that has significant ramifications for
American community philanthropy. The Attorney General argued
that the Court "should impose an affirmative requirement for effective
notice to the Attorney General, to ensure that the basic fairness in
herent in judicial proceedings is not absent from the unilateral vari
ance power's extrajudicial alternative,''54 citing its inherent powers un
der New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law and the Not-for
Profit Corporation Law. The Appellate Division rather curtly declined
to expand the Attorney General's powers in that fashion:
·

In this case . . . Community Trust explicitly possessed the variance power
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Resolution. While nothing prevented
it from notifying the Attorney General, there is no requirement at law to
do so. Furthermore, while unnamed individuals might ultimately be the
beneficiaries of the funds channeled to CSS by Community Trust, the
fact remains that the designated recipient under the trusts at issue was
CSS, to which Community Trust gave notice. In the absence of a specific
requirement, this Court declines to impose one . . . . The Attorney Gen
eral's request that this Court craft a notice requirement would be better
directed to the Legislature.55

Here, too, was a vacuum that a new form of state activism was
seeking to fill, in this case through j udicial means. If a community
foundation or trust is to exercise its "variance power,'' and if its notice
to the original beneficiary is ambiguous, as arguably occurred in New
53. A broad statement seemed to apply both to the pre-1995 and the post-1995 claims:
"[A)ll of [the Society's) claims are time-barred, since there does not appear to be any reason
to distinguish between the more recent claims, and those in the prior years. Either CSS had
notice of the repudiation or it did not. Since it clearly did, its claims . . . should be dismissed."
Id. at 185.
54. Attorney General Brief, supra note 51, at 28.
55. N. Y. Cmty. Trust, 275 A.D.2d at 186.

·
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York Community Trust, then the Attorney General should at least
have the opportunity to be put on notice and monitor the variance ex
ercise. Here, too, the Attorney General steps in to craft a role because
there appears - without litigation as in New York Community Trust
to be no other effective way to monitor such activities. In effect the
New York judiciary rebuffs the Attorney General's attempt to fashion
a regulatory role in what is, at root, a contractual relationship, viewing
judicial processes as sufficient guard against improper action and in
viting the Attorney General to approach the legislature if it disagrees.
In addition to these recent examples, the New York Attorney
General has undertaken other · highly prominent activity to monitor
nonprofits and enforce New York's nonprofit corporation and trusts
law. The Attorney General played a central role in exposing alleged
malfeasance at Hale House, a child relief center that has been one of
New York's most prominent charities.56 The Attorney General was ac
tively involved in investigations and attempts to decertify the fund
raising and spending activities of a Muslim charity, the Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, on the grounds that the or
ganization had ties to Hamas, undertaken well before the federal gov
ernment banned some of the group's banking activities after the tragic
events of September 11, 2001.57
-

56. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Overlooked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at Bl; Terry Pristin, Facing Scrutiny, President ofHale House Will Resign, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2001, at B3.
57. In early June 2001, the Attorney General initiated proceedings in state Supreme
Court to compel the Foundation to disclose its fundraising techniques, donors, recipients of
Foundation funds, and any pending lawsuits against the Foundation. See Muslim Fund In
quiry is Pressed, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at A19; Spitzer Seeks Data on Mideast Charity,
NEWSDAY, June 1, 2001, at A52. Spitzer's office said that the Foundation had ignored a Sep
tember 2000 subpoena that requested documents on fundraising and federal tax filings. See
id.

The U.S. Justice and State Departments launched investigations of the Holy Land
Foundation in the mid-1990s, focusing on alleged ties between the Foundation and Hamas,
and leading to pre-September 11 discussions of placing the Holy Land Foundation on a list
of terrorist organizations under a 1995 Presidential executive order requiring the Treasury
Department, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), to seize organiza
tional and institutional assets that are determined to pose a threat to the peace process in the
Middle East. See, e.g. , Richardson-based Foundation Has Been Subject of 4-Year Inquiry,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 2000, at lA. Israel closed the Holy Land Foundation's
Israel operations in May 1997 (along with four other charities), declaring it to be a front for
Hamas. In August 2000, the State Department requested that the U.S. Agency for Interna
tional Development ("USAID") withdraw the Foundation's listing on a roster of charities
and relief organizations eligible for USAID funding for relief work abroad, and USAID in
turn asked the State Department for evidence of the Foundation's links to Hamas. See
Bob Mahlburg & Bechetta Jackson, Area Muslims Defend Charity Group, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 26, 2000, at lOB; Judith Miller, U.S. Contends Muslim Charity Is
Tied to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A21; Muslim Charity Tied to Terrorists, U.S.
Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 2000.
American Airlines and Citigroup, among other U.S. firms, were asked before September
11 to cut or reduce business ties with the Holy Land Foundation. See Janine Zacharia,
Hamas denies it receives money via Citibank, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 26 2001, at A6. The
Foundation raised about $6.6 million in 1999, and describes its work at http://www.hlf.org.
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The Attorney General also played an active role in the now well
known dispute involving trustees and the president of Adelphi
University, in which the trustees were removed for neglect of fiduciary
obligations in approving excessive compensation for its then
President, with the Attorney General's office seeking to establish
"causes of action against the former president for breach of fiduciary
duty and against the university's trustees for [state-paid] legal fees."58
The Attorney General's office also played an active role in state-level
enforcement of corporate reforms at the United Way following allega
tions of "misappropriation and mismanagement of charitable funds"
in the early 1990s, and in suing several United Way officers for losses
suffered as a result of the misappropriated funds.59
The new state activism in nonprofit monitoring, at least in New
York, has extended beyond these cases and well beyond the judicial
arena as well. Attorney General Spitzer and his staff have publicly ad
vised New York nonprofits on the use of investment profits from non
profit endowments, warning nonprofits that "endowment fund appre
ciation cannot be expended unless the governing board appropriates
the appreciation prudently,"60 relying on the New York Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law, and advised governing boards to hold full delibera
tions and votes on the appropriation of endowment appreciation
rather than devolving those decisions entirely to nonprofit executives
or family members.61 The Attorney General's office issues annual re
ports on the activities of fundraisers registered in New York State,62
has published guidelines for directors of nonprofit boards and instruc
tions for nonprofits conducting raffles in New York,63 and warned on
quorum requirements for religious corporations undertaking transac
tions in real property,64 among other actions. .

After the September 1 1 attacks, the Holy Land Foundation was added to the OFAC pro
scribed list.
58. Vacco

v.

Diarnandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1998), discussed in The

Regulatory Role, supra note 21, at 5.

59. See Former Corporate Officers Are Liable for Misappropriating Charity Money,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1998, at 21 (reporting decision in Vacco v. Ararnony, discussed in The
Regulatory Role, supra note 21, at 5-6).
60. News from the Charities Bureau: New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Ad
vises Not-For-Profit Corporations on the Appropriation of Endowment Fund Appreciation, at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/news/endowrnent.htrnl.
61. Id.
62. Pennies for Charities: The Attorney General's Report on Fund Raisers in New York,
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.htrnl.
63. Information for Charitable Organizations Conducting Raffles in New York State, at
http://www. oag.state.ny.us/ charities/news/brochure-2-28-01.htinl.
64. Charities Bureau Update: Quorum Requirement for Religious Corporations in Real
Property Transactions, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/news/quorurn.htrnl.

1332

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1312

While Wallace-Reader's Digest and New York Community Trust
were finally resolved after A Corporate Form of Freedom went to
press, many of the themes that emerge in those disputes are mirrored
in Silber's interpretation of the post-discretionary problems of non
profit monitoring and enforcement. If "[t]he substitute that the stu
dent law review commentators offered to diminish scrutiny of non
profit purposes was a more aggressive and ongoing scrutiny after
nonprofit associations became corporate" (marked by mandatory dis
closure and enhanced state enforcement and federal tax scrutiny),
"[n]one of these turned out to be sufficiently effective."65 And into
that partial vacuum, at least in New York, bolstered by substantial
statutory oversight authority, has moved the Attorney General, ex
panding his scrutiny to include both informal but powerful attempts to
bring philanthropies to heel in the Wallace-Reader's Digest episode,
and an attempt to extend its statutory range into new areas, as in the
notification and review of the exercise of the variance power.
Attempts to migrate oversight, monitoring and enforcement are
arguably undertaken with even more vigor in times of crisis, when the
traditional patterns of oversight and coordination appear particularly
weak. This occurred after September 2001, when dozens of philan
thropic and charitable organizations sought to provide assistance to
the direct and indirect victims, individuals and organizations, of the at
tacks on the World Trade Center. As hundreds of millions of dollars in
aid became available, but implementation appeared to begin in a
chaotic fashion, the New York Attorney General stepped in to claim a
role in the coordination of that assistance.66 Eventually a data bank of
victims and available aid emerged in which the Attorney General has
a significant role,67 and the Attorney General has played a prominent
role in providing commentary on the September attacks.68
There appears to be no end to this ongoing struggle for discretion
and authority, especially when nonprofits are increasingly in the news
and when states and citizens appear increasingly concerned that the
oversight of nonprofits has fallen through regulatory cracks. The new
state activism as typified by the New York disputes seems inevitable
65. P. 146. Silber outlines the failures of mandatory disclosure and enhanced state en
forcement and federal tax scrutiny. Pp. 146-59.
66. See, e.g., David Barstow, $850 Million for Charity, Not Centrally Monitored, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at Bl; Spending ls the Hard Part, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001 , at A26.
67. See A Fair Shake for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,. 2001, § 4, at 8; Collaborative
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al8.
68. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Victims' Fund Likely to Pay Average of
$1.6 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al; Testimony of New York State

Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before the House Committee on Energy and Com
merce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Nov. 6, 2001, at
http://www.oag.stat.ny.us/press/statements/reliefnovll.html. The Attorney General's com
ments on the federal fund are available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/wtd.
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given the growth in size and complexity of the sector, the historic mi
gration of authority over the sector from judiciary to executive, and
the failure of the sector - perhaps particularly its philanthropic com
ponent - to evolve effective means and structures of self-regulation
and accountability. Silber's volume gives us the historical background
to these contemporary struggles in ways that resonate clearly as de
bates on discretion, oversight, and authority over the nonprofit sector
continue to emerge.
Five analytical and policy approaches to these problems of over
sight and accountability in the nonprofit sector have had some promi
nence. Oversight through the Internal Revenue . Service remains
problematic for any role except the direct tax consequences of non
profit activity - and even inconsistent in that arena as well.69 The po
tential for state-level charity commissions has been bruited since
Karst's well-known article, but adherence to that approach has faded
over the years as the complications of organizing .charity commissions
has become evident, and the issues in the English model have become
more clear. A third approach, press exposure of the failings of the
nonprofit sector, is a useful supplementary tool to strengthen account
ability. But press reporting on nonprofit failings tends to focus more
on the outrageous cases than on structural or widespread problems,
and, except in scandalous cases, tends to be short-lived.70
Given the weaknesses of these approaches, two others are on the
rise. One relies on nonprofits themselves, not primarily on the over
sight power of the states or the federal government, or the role of the
press. Increasingly the nonprofit community is paying attention to
strengthening self-regulation within its own arena. The nascent self
regulatory efforts underway include strengthening of the roles and ca
pacities of nonprofit boards, enhancement of internal regulatory stan
dards (including codes of conduct, standards, and principles), nascent
attempts at formalizing accreditation of nonprofits in specific geo
graphic areas or functional areas of work, improving the regulatory ef-

69. A recent General Accounting Office report reiterates this point. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN
PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARmES, GAO 02-526 (Apr. 2002); Harry
Lipman, IRS Oversight Lacking, Draft Report Says, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 2,
2002, at 36.
70. I am indebted to my colleague Sandy Boyd for discussion of this point. As Joel
Fleishman has noted:
[A]lmost invariably, the press presents a picture badly out of focus, one that is unnecessarily
alarming to the public, and even worse, that frequently undermines the public's confidence
in the possibility of effective action. The result . . . is to create an atmosphere of hysteria
which can sometimes lead to throwing out the baby with the bath.
Fleishman, quoted in Robert Bothwell, Trends in Self-Regulation and Transparency of Non
Organizations in the U. S., INT'L J. NONPROFIT L. (Sept. 2001), at
www.icnl.org/journaUjournal.htm.
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forts of non-governmental "watchdog" organizations, and strength
ening organizational disclosure and transparency.71
Some of these efforts rely on government regulatory impetus, such
as public disclosure requirements for nonprofit tax documents. Most
rely on nascent and conflictual attempts to try to build a sort of inter
nal law for the nonprofit sector, oµe that both helps govern the arena
and protect it from external criticism and additional oversight. Self
regulation has become something of a watchword in the nonprofit
community, both in the United States and abroad. Finding ways of ef
fectively implementing self-regulatory structures has, however, long
been a problem for the nonprofit sector, and despite the active and
committed efforts to strengthen self-regulation in recent years serious
questions remain as to whether the current focus on self-regulation
can be effectively substantiated.
The last of the prominent analytical approaches to nonprofit over
sight and regulation is the new state activism discussed in this Review,
typified - at least in New York - by the aggressive intervention of
the New York Attorney General in the Wallace-Reader's Digest and
New York Community Trust matters. Activist state authorities have
advantages in the oversight and regulation of the nonprofit sector, an
arena traditionally regulated at the state level, as the Silber volume
discusses, and still governed in great measure by state law. The close
ness of state authorities to local nonprofit activities, and the powers
already available in state law, would seem to make state officials a
natural source of increased nonprofit oversight.
But a renewed state activism in nonprofit oversight, whether exer
cised formally or informally, has real potential disadvantages as well.
When state authority is used informally - as in Wallace-Reader's
Digest
it can have beneficial consequences in individual cases, but
remains unevaluated by judges and holds the potential for over
reaching. And judges have rebelled against certain aspects of the new
state activism, as in the New York courts' refusal to require notice by
community foundations to the Attorney General upon exercise of the
variance power. Moreover, activism in one or several states threatens
to magnify the already highly inconsistent nature of state oversight, as
many state attorneys general or secretaries of state have neither the
interest nor the resources for a more active approach. Perhaps most
important, a new state activism in oversight of the nonprofit sector
�

71. This typology relies on the excellent work of Robert Bothwell. See Bothwell, supra
note 70. Other very useful recent work in this area includes Joel Fleishman, Public Trust in
Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehr
lich eds., 1999), and Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Gov
ernment Regulation, Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture, Mandel Ctr. for Nonprofit
Organizations, Case Western Reserve University, Mar. 16, 1999, available at
www.qual990.org/np_account.html.
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holds distinct potential for direct politicization of the Attorney
General's role, the likelihood if not the certainty of heightened state
scrutiny of specific nonprofits - or nonprofits representing specific
groups - when politics, as well as oversight and legal principles, may
demand it.
Despite these real problems, a new state activism in oversight of
the nonprofit sector appears likely to remain a force in coming years.
In fact, it may be that both of these latter approaches - a new state
activism in nonprofit oversight and increased attention to self
regulatory structures - will have continuing impact on the nonprofit
sector. Each affects primarily the post-chartering world of nonprofit
operations, not primarily the establishment or chartering stage itself.
In that sense, these new, or renewed, approaches stem from a histori
cal process in which state-level oversight of nonprofits has shifted
from a strong state discretionary role in chartering to a more limited
chartering role, with decades of exploration of alternative paths to
oversight and regulation of nonprofits and charities already in opera
tion. If strong discretionary state chartering is no longer acceptable as
a normative proposition, then post-chartering oversight and regulation
through some means, or some combination of means, must become
more effective. The new state activism, though fraught with problems,
shows one of the possible ways forward.

